"Currently, the national power of East Africa is insufficient to support deep-sea naval construction, and traditional mariti powers such as the United Kingdom and France, as well as the erging United States, inherently possess considerable naval advantages. Without unforeseen circumstances, increasing naval construction will only incite a naval race among various countries. Such a tit-for-tat competition won't narrow the naval gap between nations. Hence, every fund for the East African Navy must be spent wisely, rather than invested in an endless naval arms race." East African Defense Minister Felix said to Tirpitz.
When it cos to cooperation between two countries, generally, the stronger the ally, the better, as this strengthens one's own camp. Just like in the past, Germany chose Italy as its ally; even if it doesn't drag its feet, it might still significantly impact the global landscape.
However, the East African Governnt is clearly only willing to engage in limited cooperation with the German Navy in areas like military technology and routine exercises.
Tirpitz was naturally sowhat disappointed with the East African Governnt's lack of ambition. In his view, East Africa has the full potential to beco a powerful assistant to the German Navy in the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean.
"As a country with access to two seas, and even three (including the Pacific Ocean, where the East African Colony is mainly distributed), East Africa has defeated the British. With Germany's full support, you could entirely gain greater influence in the Indian Ocean and beco one of the founders of the new international order." Tirpitz tried to coax East Africa, drawing a picture as appealing as possible.
Germany and East Africa have a strong complentarity, with one in the Northern Hemisphere and the other predominantly in the Southern Hemisphere, with no conflicting interests and similar cultures and ethnicities. Binding East Africa to the German chariot would make the German governnt wake up laughing from dreams.
Not to ntion, if the East African Navy expands, the most nervous would be the British in the Indian Ocean, which could greatly alleviate the German Navy's pressure.
Of course, this is Germany's view; the East African Governnt has three routes to choose from: first, completely siding with Germany; second, maintaining neutrality; third, siding with the British.
Choosing the first ans East Africa is very likely to join hands with Germany in the future to confront the Allies, which for Ernst entails enormous risks. In the past, the German-led Allies and Allies were actually military equals. Whether a country of East Africa's size joining the war can change its outco is uncertain.
The answer is not necessarily, although it seems East Africa siding with the Allies could increase their winning chances. Yet, in terms of continental warfare, East Africa could actually contribute very little.
This has to do with East Africa's geographical location. The main communication channels between East Africa and Europe are three: the British-controlled Suez Canal, the British Gibraltar Colony control, and the English Channel.
So even if East Africa wants to support Germany, it isn't sothing that can be accomplished in the short term. Moreover, the British and French have the United States as a massive logistical base, which increases war uncertainties.
As for choosing the third, it's currently unrealistic. Relations between East Africa and the United Kingdom are too poor, with little likelihood of cooperation between the two countries. However, it's not impossible. After all, there are no eternal enemies, only eternal interests. If the British offer a high price, East Africa could indeed side with them.
The final option is the neutral route, which is also attractive to East Africa. In the past, the United States chose this route during the early-to-mid stages of the war. However, this resulted in the U.S. failing to change the existing world order after the war, and it had to continue watching the United Kingdom and France dominate global affairs.
All three routes are feasible, but for Ernst, he favors neutrality mainly because it involves the lowest risks, while the other two could plunge East Africa into the abyss of war.
Of course, ultimately the national policy of East Africa still needs to be chosen based on actual circumstances. The potential of these three routes in Ernst's mind is three to four to three.
However, currently, East Africa certainly won't join the conflict between Germany, the United Kingdom, and France. This involves Ernst's judgnt that a major war is unlikely to occur within the next decade.
So Ernst said: "The world order is influenced by various factors, and our East Africa is too backward and weak to participate in the global power struggle ga. Of course, from a national sentint and interest standpoint, we are undoubtedly more willing for Germany to lead the future world order."
Anyway, saying nice things costs nothing, and flattering Germany surely poses no problem. If facing France, Ernst might say similar things.
Ernst's words finally had a certain effect. Although they didn't et Tirpitz's psychological expectations, unquestionably, the current close relationship between East Africa and Germany is a solid reality, with more common interests in culture, politics, and economy.
As for East Africa's lack of enthusiasm for the global power struggle, it's understandable. Although East Africa is developing well, there is still a significant gap with European and Arican countries. At this stage, East Africa primarily focuses on developing its dostic economy and industry, without the urgency for world order reshaping as needed by the United States and Germany.
The United States and Germany's developnt has almost reached the limits that their holand can accommodate, so they urgently need more markets and raw material origins. Their dostic market and raw material supply are nearing the limit, and their comprehensive national strength has reached the standard to compete with any nation.
East Africa, however, hasn't developed to this stage yet. There are still vast undeveloped areas nationwide, and industrialization levels are low, with uneven economic and population distribution nationwide, leaving a lot of potential needing developnt.
Therefore, currently, East Africa's demand for external markets isn't as strong as Germany's or the United States'. And East Africa itself is a resource-rich country, not lacking any raw materials during the current stage of industrial developnt, unlike Germany's strong demand for raw materials.
Therefore, East Africa's primary focus remains on its holand. Only after East Africa completes its national resource developnt and economic construction will it consider deeper issues.
Though the East African Governnt's cooperative attitude towards Germany may not satisfy its appetite, useful is still better than nothing. Hence, Tirpitz had to cut down the massive plan he had formulated, as requested by the East African Governnt.
Under such circumstances, Germany naturally cannot fully support East Africa, and realistically, it's unmanageable too. The scale of East Africa is too large, with Germany at most playing a supporting role.
Thus, a "East-German Naval Cooperation Plan" with trimd ambitions was forged, and Tirpitz stayed in East Africa for another week before returning to Germany to start bold reforms.
The East-German Naval Cooperation Plan mainly achieves partial technical equipnt sharing and developnt in the technical equipnt field, simultaneously providing certain conveniences to Germany, supporting future German Navy activities in overseas areas such as the Pacific.
Regarding technical equipnt sharing and developnt, East Africa values German battleship technology, while Germany, or rather Tirpitz, is more interested in East Africa's submarine technology. The personnel from both countries will engage in exchanges and cooperation related to these fields.
Supporting German activities in overseas areas such as the Pacific mainly involves providing port conveniences to the German Navy. However, as an independent country, East Africa can only support, not offer its territory for use as a military base by Germany, at most providing temporary docking points and maintenance services for the German Navy.
The East-German Naval Cooperation Plan can only be considered limited cooperation. Under this cooperation plan, the East African Navy still adopts conservative policies, though exchanges with the German Navy beco more fluid, beneficial for the national navy in learning from others to avoid isolating itself.
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