Compared to the "Minimum Inco Law for Workers" from a few years ago, this latest version of the Minimum Inco Law is significantly more robust in terms of inco protection.
Even the weekly wages of child laborers are guaranteed to be above 90 copper coins, which is higher than the weekly wages of Spanish female citizens over 50 in the previous inco law.
The substantial increase in child laborers’ inco is mainly intended to support those impoverished families who have no choice but to let their children work.
Carlo may allow capitalists to exploit workers to a certain extent since it benefits factory production, contributes to Spain’s industrial construction, and promotes economic developnt.
But if capitalists attempt to exploit child laborers, Carlo wouldn’t mind letting them experience the might of the Spanish judiciary.
The interests of child laborers must be safeguarded, with a daily work ti not exceeding ten hours and one day off per week as Carlo’s bottom line.
This latest "Minimum Inco Law for Workers" was crafted with reference to Spain’s per capita inco. The economic conditions of various regions in Spain are not the sa, and thus the minimum inco in each region fluctuates to so extent.
However, such fluctuations only consider the problem that people in more economically developed areas should receive higher incos, and thus any adjustnts to the minimum inco law in various regions are only allowed to increase, not decrease.
The successive revisions of laws regarding the protection of workers’ interests have completely quelled the public anger caused by workers’ protests.
Again, the Spanish public still trusts the Spanish Governnt. Their anger was solely directed at the capitalists’ exploitation of workers, and they were not significantly dissatisfied with the governnt.
After the governnt consecutively anded the labor laws, the public only had satisfaction and admiration for the governnt, leaving no room for dissatisfaction or opposition.
Carlo and Duke Serrano, who led the andnts to the labor laws, also received adoration and praise from the Spanish public.
A few days later at the Madrid Royal Palace, Carlo t with Canovas, who had beco the Deputy Pri Minister of the Provisional Cabinet.
The ones who benefited most from this rebellion, besides Carlo who gained governntal power, were Duke Serrano who beca the Pri Minister and Canovas who beca the Deputy Pri Minister.
Anyone with keen insight could see that Duke Serrano becoming the Pri Minister was only transitional, and Canovas would undoubtedly formally assu the role of Pri Minister thereafter.
The reasons are simple. Firstly, Duke Serrano, at the age of 65, didn’t have enough energy to beco the controller of the Spanish Governnt.
Additionally, Duke Serrano already possessed high prestige in the military and had served as Spain’s Minister of Defense for two terms since the revolution.
If he were to beco Pri Minister again, wouldn’t his prestige rival that of forr Pri Minister Prim? Carlo, who had finally seized the opportunity to power, wouldn’t allow the ergence of another Pri Minister Prim.
This very thought led many parliantarians and officials to believe that Canovas, who didn’t have much prestige in the military, would ultimately beco Spain’s Pri Minister.
Carlo thought the sa, not out of concern about Duke Serrano, but because he believed that the younger Canovas was more suitable to beco Spain’s Pri Minister.
Born in 1828, Canovas was currently just 47 years old. In the position of Pri Minister, Canovas clearly was in his pri, having ample ti and energy to manage Spain’s affairs.
Moreover, Duke Serrano, being 65 years old already, wasn’t skilled in politics and economic developnt, which was why he let Prim beco Pri Minister after the revolution and beca the Minister of Defense himself.
Allowing Canovas to take over as Spain’s Pri Minister would an, because of his pri age, he could cooperate with Carlo for two terms, totaling ten years.
Such a long-lasting period of governance is an invaluable developntal stage for the current Spain. The concern is that too frequent regis’ changes could cause a country with the potential for rapid developnt to fall into stagnation due to the alternation of power.
Historically, Spain during this period underwent similar issues due to internal turmoil and frequent regi changes. After Queen Isabel ca the Provisional Governnt, followed by Amadeo I, then the Republican Governnt, and finally Alfonso XII.
During this period, regardless of whether it was the three kings or the Provisional and Republican Governnts, Spain’s Pri Minister and President positions never had truly stable candidates.
This resulted in Spain historically having almost no stable space for developnt during this ti and missing out on a golden period for developnt, thus leading Spain into irreversible decline.
Carlo would not repeat the sa mistake. Unless the Spanish Pri Minister had issues with loyalty, Carlo wouldn’t consider changing Pri Ministers too frequently.
Of course, if there were competence issues, a change would be necessary. After all, only a competent Pri Minister could drive the country’s developnt, whereas one lacking capability would only worsen the situation.
anwhile, Spanish political parties and parliantarians were concerned with reorganizing Parliant and holding new elections, while Carlo was worried about handling the large tracts of land acquired after the confiscation of noble properties.
Speaking of which, even if almost a hundred noble participants in the rebellion, they only made up a tenth of Spain’s noble class.
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