At the opening of 1999, Manchester City avoided what would have been one of the biggest FA Cup upsets of modern tis and defeated Rushden & Diamonds. Not only that, one of the first Premier League gas of the year included City’s 2–1 away win over Arsenal.
In the sa round of fixtures, Manchester United clinched a 2–0 victory at ho against Everton. Ferguson must have been raising a toast to Manchester City for taking down their current stalkers, Arsenal. As a result, United extended their lead over the Gunners to five points, while Arsenal dropped from second place to third, overtaken by Chelsea.
Everyone saw a similar scenario unfold around the sa ti last year between City and Arsenal; however, this ti the positions of United, Arsenal, and Chelsea were switched, making the situation even tighter.
After the defeat, Wenger walked over to Mourinho and offered a firm handshake. Soon from his seat outside the VIP section, Richard could finally understand why Wenger was able to win the hearts of his players and the fans.
After the handshake, Wenger did not rush to leave; instead, he took a mont to greet every player on the pitch, spoke quietly to a few, placed a hand on a shoulder here and there, and offered words of encouragent rather than reproach.
So players noticed this and were visibly downcast and reluctant at first, but with Wenger taking the lead, all could not help but follow. Only after that did they head down the tunnel, with Wenger being the last to leave the pitch.
After the match, Manchester City’s post-match press conference was charged with tension. While there was no direct reprimand, many of the questions were pointed. As expected from the Fleet Street press.
Several journalists focused on Arsenal’s opening goal, where Thuram was overwheld by Bergkamp, who burst past him before Anelka finished to break City’s resistance.
In response, Mourinho staunchly defended his players, particularly Thuram. It was undeniable that he had a poor showing in this match. The goals City conceded stemd from mistakes during counterattacks, with Bergkamp seizing the opportunity to drive to the byline and whip in a cross before Anelka scored.
Mourinho dismissed the idea that Thuram was solely to bla for Arsenal’s first goal, insisting that no one else would have perford better in his position had they been selected.
He tried to approach the team’s issues with a calm mindset. He believed that even if they lost, defeat was simply part and parcel of football—no team goes unbeaten throughout a season. Especially with such a tight schedule, if the team was not in good form, they needed to identify the problems and address them. Getting back on the right path would take ti, unless they fell into an unstoppable downward spiral, which would be a real cause for concern.
The two weeks following the Arsenal match were dedicated to cup competitions, with City set to play two fixtures: an FA Cup quarter-final and a League Cup semi-final against Middlesbrough.
Before the matches, after returning to the club, Mourinho held a coaches’ eting, to which Richard was unexpectedly invited.
Reflecting on the match against Arsenal, Mourinho noted how Arsenal’s defensive setup had stifled City’s attacking opportunities—a challenge they had often encountered during the first half of the season.
"Parking the bus" had been a common tactic City faced in recent months. However, against a more organised side like Arsenal, it presented a different level of difficulty, as their counterattacking approach was systematic and well planned. Mourinho recognised that this version of Arsenal closely resembled City in his early days at the club.
Back then, under Martin O’Neill, City had often played a 4–4–2 formation. One of the strikers—usually Larsson—would drop deep in a role similar to Bergkamp’s, using pace and movent to initiate breakthroughs while maintaining defensive discipline to create attacking opportunities. This fundantal approach had once been the bedrock of City’s playstyle. Yet it was now rarely employed in the Premier League, even if it still defined their approach in the Champions League, albeit with a different formation.
The difficulty in re-establishing this style in the Premier League stemd largely from opponents’ defensive strategies. As reigning champions, City frequently faced teams content to sit deep and play for a draw, with both sides walking away with a single point.
In a tense eting with the squad, Mourinho didn’t sugarcoat the situation. The room was quiet, the players aware that the usual post-training pep talk had been replaced with sothing more serious. He began by acknowledging the improvents they had made over the past months.
"Physical preparation is only part of the ga," he said, his eyes scanning the room. "Technique is nothing without understanding. Too many of you still don’t read the ga properly. You run, you pass, you defend—but you do it chanically. That stops here."
He paused, letting the words sink in before pointing to the whiteboard, where diagrams of City’s defensive and attacking patterns had been drawn. "Look at this," he said. "This is what they do. This is why we struggled. You must internalize the principles, not just follow instructions. If you don’t think the ga the way it’s ant to be played, no amount of training or fitness will help."
Mourinho attributed this critical shortcoming to the Arsenal match, where the flaws in City’s setup had been brutally exposed.
He noticed that Pirlo, normally the orchestrator in midfield, had large gaps in his defensive positioning. Against weaker teams, these weaknesses had gone largely unnoticed—the opponents lacked the pace and precision to exploit them. But Arsenal’s wingers, Bergkamp and Overmars, they beca constant, pressing threats.
Unexpectedly, rather than Pirlo himself, it was Thuram who lowered his head after hearing this. Indeed, a single hesitation from him—even just a fraction of a second—could—and did—lead to significant defensive lapses.
Offensively, the situation was equally concerning. Larsson struggled to impose himself in this match. When opportunities ca, he repeatedly ran into the sa problem: relentless pressing from the opposition, leaving him little space or ti to develop aningful attacks. His instinct was always to push forward—attack, attack, attack—but without tactical awareness, these attempts often ended in turnovers or wasted possession.
In the Premier League, technical skill alone was insufficient. Physicality and endurance were equally vital. When City’s players couldn’t match their opponents in duels or withstand the intensity of challenges, matches beca punishing. Mourinho knew that unless these gaps—both ntal and physical—were addressed, the team would continue to struggle, especially against high-caliber, organized sides like Arsenal.
Mourinho continued to highlight the players’ positional errors on the large TV screen. The other coaches watched intently, as a significant part of their roles involved addressing these mistakes in training to improve the players’ skills.
After the eting, only the coaching staff remained, along with Richard. The new coach, Ru Faria, who had never stood out before, seed to be in another world. After a few monts, he suddenly tapped on the table, drawing everyone’s attention.
"I think our rotation strategy for the first half of the season was flawed."
"..."
Everyone was taken aback by the opening remark—even Mourinho.
"What’s wrong?" soone asked.
"No, I just think our rotation strategy for the next two matches needs adjustnt. We must field our strongest squad," Ru Faria said.
"..."
"Rui, are you suggesting that our first-choice lineup should go all out to close the gap in the cup? That’s dangerous. Whether in the league, the FA Cup, or the League Cup, these tournants span more than six months. You need to ensure the team’s overall sustainability. If we misallocate our physical resources, we might find ourselves struggling in the last 13–14 gas, when we need to push the hardest!"
Mourinho frowned and expressed his views.
Baltemar Brito also supported Mourinho, saying, "Our rotation strategy has worked for the past three seasons. It’s guaranteed results I think?"
Rui Faria waved a hand, then stood up and looked at all of them. "No, I’m not saying that rotation itself is the issue, but rather that we miscalibrated our rotation based on our opponents."
Everyone looked puzzled, unsure of what he ant.
He walked over to the calendar and then put it to the blackboard for everyone to see. He pointed to 1–14 and stated, "Before the season, based on fixture congestion and potential injuries, we planned for our first-choice lineup to face the top two tiers of teams—those we classified as upper- and mid-tier teams, roughly positions 1–14. The remaining teams, ranked 15 and below, would be handled by the substitutes, right?"
Everyone nodded.
Rui Faria continued, "Conventional wisdom suggests that teams ranked 15 and below are weaker than those in 1–14. Thus, it seems logical to have our substitutes play against these weaker Premier League teams. However, we overlooked a critical fact: we are the Premier League champions! Even teams ranked 15 and lower are desperate for points, and they’ll adopt a conservative approach just to secure a draw. Our substitutes lack the experience for these grinding battles. The result? Players—mostly those with speed and skill—are unable to showcase their strengths. They fail to develop defensive awareness because they rarely face intense opposition. They remain stuck in an endless attacking cycle, unable to defend properly, which is a huge issue. We miscalibrated our strategy!"
The coaches exchanged glances, surprised by the dilemmas he had raised. Even Richard was taken aback and deep in thought. In any elite club, using substitutes against weaker opponents is common practice. Isn’t that standard? However, many top teams have lost matches they should have won by underestimating the opposition.
City’s first half of the season had been a clear example of this. With most players absent due to food poisoning, the team in the first half relied almost entirely on players like Zidane for creativity and building attacks.
Mourinho, with a serious expression, asked, "So, what do you suggest we do to adjust?"
Rui Faria wiped his tactical board clean and wrote down another series of numbers.
"We should assign teams ranked 1–8 and those ranked 15 and below—representing the strongest and weakest in the Premier League—to our first-choice squad. The top-tier teams provide high-stakes competition, while the bottom-tier teams make it easier for our main players to secure points. The 9–14-ranked teams should be handled by the substitutes."
Mourinho countered, "This ans our substitute squad would not hold an advantage against these teams and might even be at a complete disadvantage."
Rui Faria replied firmly, "That’s why we need to adjust our tactics. When the substitutes play, we must adopt a conservative approach, allowing the opponent to attack. This will give our newcors the necessary defensive experience and help build their team awareness. At the sa ti, by focusing on counterattacks, they can gradually gain confidence in their ga."
"But what if the opponent also plays defensively? Like Spurs at White Hart Lane, and they were content just to hold a draw?"
Rui spread his hands. "That’s why we need to let them know we are fielding a young team. Before the ga, we must communicate this—it will be my psychological tactic against the opponent."
Mourinho, intrigued, asked, "And how do you plan to do this?"
"Just as I said, we reveal the starting lineup early and observe how the opponents react. If they see a squad they perceive as a bunch of kids, will they still defend with full intensity? Teams ranked 9–14 are in a comfortable position; they don’t face heavy relegation pressure, and their ambitions for European competition are limited. They focus more on dostic cups, so in league matches, they won’t risk everything. With an average player age under 23, do they really think they can afford to play it safe? Would their fans accept that? The flaw in our previous strategy was underestimating the so-called weakest teams—they are often the most desperate to fight for survival. We need to focus on securing points while nurturing our young talent, which requires a strategic shift."
The coaches exchanged looks, nodding in agreent. They had to admit his perspective had rit.
Mid-table teams playing against City’s substitutes had little to gain from parking the bus. If they faced City’s first team, full defensive commitnt would be justified due to the significant difference in strength. But if they faced the substitutes and still chose to defend, it would raise serious questions about their commitnt and attract substantial dia scrutiny.
Everyone suddenly turned to look at Richard, who was sitting in silence. But Richard didn’t want to interfere. His face betrayed nothing, though inside he felt a quiet satisfaction seeing the new coach brainstorming with the team like this.
"Fine then!" Mourinho finally said, breaking the tension.
Seeing that Richard had no objections, Mourinho gave Rui Faria the floor to modify the strategy on the spot.
Rui nodded and moved to the board, carefully considering the numbers and the upcoming fixtures. He began rewriting the rotation strategy, taking into account the strength of the first-choice squad, the capabilities of the substitutes, and the tactical adjustnts necessary against mid-tier teams.
By the end of the day, the rotation strategy had been completely rewritten. The team now had a clear roadmap for the coming weeks, balancing competitive play for the main squad with developnt and experience for the substitutes.
"This is the key part—about players who lack defensive discipline, especially the younger ones," Rui replied. "We will assign experienced ntors to guide them during gas and training. Each substitute pairing will include one player who can organize the backline, communicate, and adjust positions in real-ti. This way, even against persistent pressing, the team can remain compact, reduce mistakes, and gradually build defensive awareness."
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