Genius Grandson Of The Loan Shark King Chapter 609: This Was the Worst Choice

President Yoon Changho and Chairman of the National Defense Commission Jang Songthaek were in agreent.

“You can assu that it’s extrely rare for the Japanese governnt to lower itself this much. You both know better than anyone how shaless those people are, don’t you? An opportunity like this may never co again.”

Whether it was the South Korean governnt or the North Korean governnt, would there ever be another chance to extract concessions this generous from Japan?

This was clearly the first—and the last—ti.

“So you think it would be better to let Japan attend, President Kim? Do you have a good idea?”

After deliberating, Yoon Changho asked . I nodded at his question and slowly pulled up one corner of my mouth.

“Even if Japan attends, how much say do you think they’ll really have? The five countries have already finished coordinating everything in advance. No matter how much Japan thrashes about, we can simply ignore them. If we can gain sothing just by letting Japan attend, then it seems better to let them in.”

I deliberately laid out a long preface to pique their curiosity.

Deep contemplation settled over the faces of Yoon Changho and Jang Songthaek.

“To start with, how about the North Korean governnt demanding that the term ‘compensation’ be explicitly stated in the Japan–North Korea reparations negotiations, rather than ‘consolation money’? The amount itself can be negotiated gradually, but the word ‘compensation’ is sothing the Japanese governnt will find very difficult to accept. Demand that as a condition for allowing them to attend this eting.”

At my suggestion, Jang Songthaek’s eyes widened. But soon, he furrowed his brow and shook his head.

“Do you really think Japan would agree to that? Every past round of talks between our Republic and Japan has collapsed precisely because that gap could not be narrowed. Would they accept such a crucial issue just to attend this five-party eting?”

I thought the sa. Japan would almost certainly refuse North Korea’s demand.

With Japanese dostic opinion in turmoil, Pri Minister Koizumi was desperate to attend this eting—but there was no way he would choose the incendiary word ‘compensation.’

But when negotiations begin, it’s best to start by throwing out sothing big.

To gain the upper hand, you first present a demand you know the other side will never accept. When they push back, only then do you propose what you actually want.

Psychologically, it makes them think, Wouldn’t this much be acceptable?

“They won’t accept it. But we can raise the amount we receive. Once we demand that it be labeled as compensation, they’ll say that’s impossible. That’s when we pivot to negotiating the amount of the compensation instead.”

“So we accept ‘consolation money,’ but extract a larger sum in return?”

“Yes. It’s a proposal suited to you, Chairman, given your emphasis on substance over form. Rather than fixating on whether it’s called compensation or consolation money, it would be better to squeeze out as much money as possible. On top of that, securing paid investnts from Japanese corporations would be even better. Of course, that depends on North Korea’s negotiating ability.”

At my proposal, Jang Songthaek closed his eyes and fell into deep thought.

To give him ti, I turned my gaze to Yoon Changho instead.

“As for the South Korean governnt······.”

“What would South Korea even gain? Dokdo was already declared off-limits in the last round, and aside from an apology for historical issues—which they won’t give—there’s nothing left.”

“Still, it would be better to secure economic benefits. If we make demands that are too excessive, Japan will never agree.”

“That’s exactly why I’m troubled. What economic benefit can South Korea realistically extract from Japan right now?”

“Mr. President, then how about resolving the issue of Block 7 this ti?”

“Block 7? You think Japan would concede that? They’ll try to drag things out until the joint developnt agreent between Korea and Japan expires in 2028, won’t they?”

At the ntion of Block 7, Yoon Changho’s previously dismissive gaze changed.

“Was it 2002? Anyway, from around then until recently, we conducted repeated physical surveys and analyses of the Block 7 area. But this year, Japan has taken the position that it lacks economic viability. They’re just trying to stall.”

Block 7 was believed to hold massive reserves of oil and gas.

The UN and international organizations had even issued reports estimating reserves of 100 billion barrels of oil and 210 trillion tons of natural gas.

Saudi Arabia was known to hold around 260 billion barrels of oil and about 22 trillion tons of natural gas.

While the oil reserves didn’t surpass Saudi Arabia’s, the natural gas reserves were more than ten tis greater.

They were even estimated to be over five tis larger than Russia’s reserves—about 40 trillion tons—the largest natural gas reserves in the world.

Because of this, the President at the ti had declared Block 7 Korean territory ahead of Japan.

Japan, of course, objected.

Under international law at the ti, the continental shelf extension principle had been adopted in the North Sea continental shelf ruling, and since Korea had designated Block 7 first, the area extending from the Korean Peninsula could be considered Korean territory.

Political confrontation followed, and the South Korean governnt ultimately shelved its sovereignty claim and signed an agreent to designate the area as a Korea–Japan joint developnt zone.

‘But this was the worst choice.’

Later, international mariti law incorporating the concept of exclusive economic zones ca into effect.

From that point on, Japan adopted a lukewarm stance toward exploration and developnt, deliberately dragging out the process. Eventually, the joint developnt that began in 1980 was provisionally suspended in 1988.

Because of a poison-pill clause stating that unilateral exploration or developnt by either Korea or Japan was impossible without joint exploration, ti simply passed.

Exploiting the warm atmosphere in Korea–Japan relations following the co-hosting of the 2002 Korea–Japan World Cup, exploration resud—but this year, that effort was also halted.

“Japan intends to stall until the agreent expires in 2028, then have exclusive ownership recognized and proceed with developnt on its own.”

Japan simply didn’t want to share enormous economic benefits with Korea.

The oil and gas buried there weren’t going anywhere, and there was no reason to split the profits fifty–fifty with Korea.

Under international mariti law, if a dian line were drawn between Japan and Korea, over 90% of Block 7 would clearly fall under Japanese ownership.

Even in my previous life, re-exploration never took place before I died.

This was the only proposal that benefited both and the South Korean governnt.

“But, Mr. President. There’s sothing both Korea and Japan are overlooking.”

“Sothing both countries are overlooking? What is it?”

“China. There’s a high probability that China will also assert ownership over Block 7. It would be better to move quickly with exploration and developnt and secure recognition from the international community first.”

In ti, China would succeed in developing oil fields less than one kiloter from Block 7.

From that point on, they would begin asserting claims over Block 7 as well.

If the agreent expired as things stood, China would inevitably step in, and with all three countries asserting ownership, matters would beco even more complicated.

“Hmmm······. As you say, this does seem like the best option. But would Japan accept it?”

“We’re not asking them to hand it over completely—just to resu joint developnt. What’s the problem with that?”

“What if they stall again, citing economic feasibility like they did this ti? That wouldn’t be the first ti they’ve done that.”

Yoon Changho’s concern was entirely reasonable.

“That problem is easy to solve. Instead of Korea and Japan each forming their own exploration teams like before, both sides should agree first, then sign a contract with an oil company and leave it to them. Once a new contract is in place, neither side will be able to unilaterally declare a halt to exploration.”

“Is there a major oil company that both Korea and Japan would trust?”

“Don’t I own an oil company in Russia? We can leave it to them.”

The worried expression on Yoon Changho’s face brightened.

“Ah, right! I completely forgot. You did say you beca the owner of Russia’s largest oil company, Yukos, didn’t you?”

“Yes. Strictly speaking, I acquired a subsidiary of Yukos······. But in effect, that’s the sa as acquiring all of Yukos’ assets.”

“If you’re the one handling it, our governnt can trust the arrangent. If Japan accepts this, I’ll insist on Japan’s participation without hesitation. The United States will probably go along with it.”

Yoon Changho was convinced. Now only Jang Songthaek remained.

When I looked back at him, he opened his eyes and asked,

“······President Kim Muhyuk. Would you take charge of the backchannel negotiations with Japan? If you accept this role, our Republic will also advocate for Japan’s participation.”

The condition Jang Songthaek presented was unexpected. He wanted to handle the Japan–North Korea reparations negotiations behind the scenes.

It seed those negotiations were facing considerable difficulty.

After rejecting the idea earlier, he was now proposing it himself.

If soone sets the table for you, you’d be a fool not to eat. I nodded with a deliberately serious expression.

“Very well. I’ll take responsibility and conduct the negotiations in a way that’s as advantageous to North Korea as possible.”

I had succeeded in persuading both of them. Now the question was whether Pri Minister Koizumi would accept it.

I took my phone from the inside pocket of my suit.

“I’ll contact Pri Minister Koizumi now. However, this will be an unofficial conversation between leaders. Anything said here must not be disclosed for any reason.”

Both Yoon Changho and Jang Songthaek nodded in agreent.

With their consent, I called Pri Minister Koizumi’s private number.

The phone ❀ Nоvеlігht ❀ (Don’t copy, read here) rang only a few tis before the call connected.

“Pri Minister. This is Kim Muhyuk. Are you able to speak right now?”

—Hmm······. Could you give a mont?

A short while later. I heard the sound of a door opening and closing, as if he had moved locations, and then his voice returned.

—You may speak now. Have you already persuaded them?

Expectation colored Koizumi’s voice.

“I’ve persuaded both the South and the North.”

—Is that true?

“Yes. I’m with both of them right now. I’ll switch to speakerphone. Everything discussed here is unofficial. I expect nothing to leak. If today’s call is ever used politically, from that mont on, I will conduct no further business with the Japanese governnt.”

—Of course.

Koizumi replied imdiately. I turned on the speaker function and placed the phone on the table.

“I’ll state the demands of the South Korean governnt and the North Korean governnt.”

—Let’s hear them.

“First, the North Korean governnt wants the term ‘compensation’ explicitly stated in the Japan–North Korea reparations negotiations. If you accept this, they will persuade China and Russia.”

—Impossible! That is absolutely impossible.

The refusal ca instantly, without the slightest hesitation.

Just as expected.

Jang Songthaek frowned at , and I nodded before speaking.

“If this condition is not accepted, then negotiations will be impossible not only with North Korea, but with South Korea as well.”

—President Kim. I would rather not attend the eting at all than agree to that. That can never be accepted.

At that mont, Jang Songthaek, who had been listening quietly, spoke up.

“Pri Minister Koizumi. This is Jang Songthaek.”

—Chairman of the National Defense Commission Jang Songthaek. It’s been a long ti.

“I’ll be blunt. If using the term ‘compensation’ is difficult, then pay the amount we demand instead. If you agree to that, I will advocate for Japan’s participation.”

—As for the matter of consolation money, that is sothing to be negotiated between our two countries······.

“Listen, Pri Minister. This is an unofficial conversation. Don’t try to dodge the issue. If you refuse this, our Republic will reject dialogue with Japan altogether.”

Even I was taken aback by his statent.

Jang Songthaek had played a hard card—declaring a complete break.

“For the sake of backchannel negotiations, President Kim Muhyuk will represent us. You should prepare a decision-maker of equivalent authority on your side as well. Can you do that?”

—······.

“Pri Minister Koizumi. Shouldn’t relations between North Korea and Japan be improved? Shouldn’t we all put the past behind us and live well together? Am I wrong?”

After a long silence, Koizumi let out a quiet sigh.

—If the amount is not excessively unreasonable, we will do our best to match the sum requested by the North Korean governnt. The exact figure can be determined through negotiations.

It was Koizumi’s declaration of surrender.