The deploynt order went out at midnight on May 25th, 1947.
Colonel Thapa received it via secure telephone at the military cantonnt in Pathankot — the staging area that Vikram had insisted on preparing weeks earlier, over the objections of military bureaucrats who couldn't understand why resources were being pre-positioned for a contingency that hadn't materialized yet.
Now those resources were the difference between success and catastrophe.
The order was simple in its language and staggering in its ambition: deploy the 1st Sikh Regint and supporting elents to Srinagar by air and road within seventy-two hours.
Simultaneously, dispatch a chanized column north through the Jhelum Valley to secure the route to Gilgit.
Establish defensive positions along the western approaches — Uri, Baramulla, Muzaffarabad — to block any incursion from Pakistani-controlled territory.
And do all of this before Pakistan could react.
Thapa, to his eternal credit, didn't waste ti asking questions. He'd been briefed on Operation Himalaya.
He'd studied the plans. He'd prepared his units. When the order ca, he moved.
By 6 AM on May 26th, the first Dakota transport aircraft — carrying forty soldiers each — lifted off from Pathankot airfield and banked north toward the mountains.
The Srinagar airstrip, a modest facility built during the war, had been quietly surveyed and prepared by Kao's operatives over the preceding weeks.
Landing zones were marked. Fuel supplies pre-positioned. Communication equipnt installed.
Vikram stood at Pathankot airfield watching the Dakotas disappear into the dawn sky, each aircraft a speck against the vast canvas of the Himalayas.
The mountains lood above them — white-capped, ancient, indifferent to the human drama unfolding at their feet.
In the original tiline, he thought, this airlift happened in October — a desperate, improvised scramble to save Srinagar from tribal invaders who were already at the city's gates.
Pilots flew overloaded aircraft through mountain passes they'd never navigated, landing on airstrips they'd never seen, delivering soldiers who went straight from the tarmac into combat.
This ti, we're five months early. We're prepared. We're organized.
And we have the legal authority of the Maharaja's accession backing every move.
This ti, we don't lose a single inch.
Patel had returned to Delhi imdiately after the accession signing, leaving Vikram and Kao in Kashmir to oversee the military deploynt.
The Sardar's presence was needed in the capital — Mountbatten had to be inford, Nehru had to be brought on board, and the political machinery of the Congress had to be aligned behind the Kashmir integration.
non handled the constitutional formalities with his usual efficiency.
The Instrunt of Accession was filed with the Viceroy's office on May 26th. Mountbatten, inford by Patel in a private eting, raised no objection — the accession was legally valid, voluntarily signed, and consistent with the frawork he'd endorsed for the transfer of power.
He did, however, express concern about the military deploynt.
"The Viceroy wants assurances that Indian forces will not cross into Pakistani territory," non reported by telephone. "He's worried about escalation."
"Tell him that Indian forces will operate exclusively within the boundaries of Jammu and Kashmir — sovereign Indian territory as of May 24th," Vikram replied.
"We're not invading Pakistan. We're defending India."
"He also wants to know about the northern areas. Gilgit and Baltistan are garrisoned by British officers.
Deploying Indian forces there while British personnel are still present creates a diplomatic complication."
"The British officers in Gilgit are actively conspiring to transfer the territory to Pakistan — we have docunted evidence.
Their authority derives from the Maharaja, who has now acceded to India. As Indian sovereign territory, Gilgit falls under Indian military jurisdiction.
The British officers will be given the choice to cooperate or to leave. There is no third option."
non was quiet for a mont. "You realize, Rathore, that you're issuing instructions that affect the lives of thousands of soldiers and the diplomatic relationship between India and Britain — and you're doing it from a guesthouse in Kashmir with no official rank or title."
"I'm conveying Sardar Patel's strategic directives, sir. If the Sardar disagrees with any of my recomndations, he'll tell ."
"He hasn't yet. Which either ans you're right about everything or he's too busy to notice."
"I prefer to think it's the forr."
"So do I. That's what worries ."
The deploynt proceeded on two axes — south-to-north and west-to-east — like the arms of a compass reaching outward from Srinagar to embrace the entire territory of Kashmir.
The Southern Axis: The 1st Sikh Regint, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ranjit Singh Rana, airlifted into Srinagar over three days.
By May 28th, a full battalion was on the ground — eight hundred soldiers with light weapons, mortars, and enough ammunition for sustained operations.
They imdiately established defensive positions along the Uri-Baramulla road — the invasion route that Vikram knew the tribal militias would use — and sent patrols west toward Muzaffarabad, securing bridges, passes, and communication points.
The soldiers were professional, disciplined, and highly motivated. Many were Sikhs from Punjab who understood — perhaps better than anyone — what was at stake.
The communal violence already erupting in Punjab had given them a visceral appreciation for the consequences of partition.
They were determined that Kashmir would not suffer the sa fate.
The Northern Axis: This was the critical — and most dangerous — elent of the deploynt.
A chanized column of 200 soldiers, led by Major Pritam Singh, departed Srinagar on May 27th, heading north along the road toward Gilgit.
The journey was 400 kiloters through so of the most treacherous terrain on earth — mountain passes above 13,000 feet, narrow tracks carved into cliff faces, river crossings on bridges that looked like they'd been built during the Mughal era and hadn't been maintained since.
Vikram had given Major Pritam Singh a specific briefing before departure — the most sensitive briefing he'd delivered since arriving in 1947.
"Major, your objective is to reach Gilgit before Major William Brown and the Gilgit Scouts can organize a transfer of authority to Pakistan.
Brown has been in communication with Pakistani-sympathetic elents — we have intelligence confirming this.
He may try to preempt your arrival by declaring the northern areas independent or by handing them to Pakistan directly."
"And if he does, sir?"
"Then you secure the area by force. The Gilgit Scouts are a paramilitary force — approximately 500 n, lightly ard, with no armor or artillery.
Your column has superior firepower and training. But I want to be clear: the use of force is a last resort.
If Brown cooperates — if he accepts that the Maharaja's accession is legally binding and that Indian authority supersedes British paramountcy — we treat him with respect and allow him to withdraw peacefully."
"And if he doesn't cooperate?"
"Then he and his officers are disard, detained, and escorted out of Kashmir.
The Gilgit Scouts are offered the choice of integration into the Indian Army or honorable discharge.
No violence against British personnel unless they initiate it. We're not at war with Britain. We're asserting sovereign authority over our own territory."
To be continued..
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