The Second Moroccan Crisis can also be referred to as the Agadir Crisis. Ernst wasn’t particularly familiar with this piece of history, but the fact that it left an impression on him indicates its significance.
In the following days, East Africa’s European intelligence system continuously relayed updates to the East African mainland about the movents of Germany and France during this current crisis.
"Nationalistic sentints are running high in the public opinions of Germany and France, and there are signs of troop mobilizations to the frontline. A war between Germany and France might break out!"
This was the news that ca back on the second day after the Agadir Crisis erupted, causing concern for the East African Governnt, especially for Ernst. In his heart, he hoped that Europe would not go to war at this ti.
At this current stage, East Africa was not prepared to deal with a European war. In fact, since the start of the second five-year plan, Ernst had been preparing for the outbreak of a European war, adjusting so indices of the national defense and light industry developnt at that ti.
However, the third five-year plan marked the beginning of a large-scale transformation of dostic industrial developnt for Ernst, to prepare for the outbreak of a European war.
According to the East African Governnt’s vision, if a major war broke out in Europe within a few years, dostic industries in East Africa would adapt to the warti conditions in Europe to carry out large-scale production activities, fulfilling the order demands of European countries and quickly expanding to global markets outside Europe.
However, the third five-year plan had just begun, and many East African enterprises had not yet completed their transformation. If a full-scale European war broke out at this ti, the benefits East Africa would eventually gain would be significantly reduced.
Therefore, for the "peace and stability" of Europe, Ernst issued an order: "Question both the German and French governnts, probe their attitudes, and as much as possible persuade them not to act recklessly."
A war between Germany and France is inevitable, and East Africa also hopes to see this war break out and spread across Europe, but East Africa does not want a full-scale European war to erupt at this ti. Ideally, it should wait until East African industries are basically adjusted, which is what the East African Governnt wants to see most.
With Ernst’s order, the East African Ministry of Foreign Affairs swiftly reacted, beginning to shuttle back and forth between the German and French governnts.
Besides East Africa’s nervousness, countries on the European Continent also felt a storm brewing, and the United Kingdom, in this round of diplomatic conflict, seed rather at a loss.
This was evident from British public opinion, which remained unusually silent when Germany and France were hurling verbal accusations at each other and showing signs of a major conflict.
This is similar to East African public opinion, where except at the governntal level, there was no significant reaction among the general populace. After all, East Africa is far from Europe, and a full-scale European war would an nothing to ordinary East Africans.
But British silence in public opinion is vastly different. Although the United Kingdom is not on the European mainland, it is only a sea away from it, and the likelihood of being dragged into the turmoil due to changes in the European situation is quite high. Therefore, most countries cannot figure out the intentions of the British Governnt at this ti.
On July 5th, the German Governnt finally made a clear response to East Africa. However, the response left Ernst feeling speechless.
Minister of Foreign Affairs Frier reported to Ernst: "This ti, Germany’s political actions are mostly speculative. According to disclosures from German officials, they are inclined to negotiate with France to extort so overseas interests from France to compensate for Germany’s losses."
What are Germany’s losses? To put it plainly, it’s the Morocco matter Germany now promotes as affecting German interests. And Germany’s statent clearly indicates that it does not intend to compete with the French Governnt for dominance in Morocco anymore.
In truth, from an objective standpoint, Germany’s actions in Morocco this ti had so elents of frivolity because during the first Moroccan Crisis, Germany had already temporarily reached an understanding with France, essentially agreeing to France’s interests in Morocco.
Furthermore, France’s colonial activities in Morocco have long been established. Being in North Africa, Morocco is only separated from France by the diterranean, and France has always aid to establish a Greater France spanning the diterranean, with Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and even Libya within France’s strategic expansion scope.
The trigger for the Agadir Crisis, in fact, was an internal crisis in Morocco, where opposition forces launched a rebellion, prompting Germany to seize the opportunity to provoke in Morocco.
Ernst asked: "What do the Germans want?"
Frier replied: "They want France’s colony in Gabon as compensation for this incident and hope that we can support them in the upcoming negotiations between the two countries."
The Gabon Colony can be described as France’s last colonial possession in the Central African region, quite different from its historical counterpart.
Due to East Africa’s influence, Belgium occupied parts of what was historically Congo-Brazzaville and so of Gabon’s land, forcing French Gabon to expand northward.
And north of Gabon is German Caroon, so the current Gabon Colony actually includes most of historical Gabon along with the southern part of Caroon.
Germany clearly aims to use Morocco as a bargaining condition to acquire France’s Gabon Colony. In essence, Morocco is a French colony viewed by France as a core interest of its African colonial endeavor.
Germany’s current behavior is akin to plucking "food" from France’s table and expecting France to pay for the al Germany ordered, akin to taking advantage of both ends.
Ernst could imagine how indignant France would feel if it acceded to Germany’s demands. Historically, Germany ultimately achieved this objective, but France endured it.
However, today’s French Gabon’s position is incomparable to its historical counterpart. It’s important to know that historically, French Gabon was a relatively insignificant part of France’s colonial possessions.
After all, without Gabon, France still had French Congo, but with Congo-Brazzaville now under Belgian control, Gabon has beco France’s only colony in Central Africa.
Moreover, with Gabon neighboring East Africa, this further increases its strategic importance. East Africa is not the fragnted collection of indigenous African nations that history recalls but is instead one of the world’s important Great Powers, thus naturally elevating the value of land or countries bordering East Africa.
Take Belgian Congo for instance; without Belgium, it would have achieved little, but East Africa’s proximity allows Belgian Congo’s colonial governnt to generate substantial revenue through trade with East Africa, including exporting iron ore, tin ore, and potash to East Africa.
East Africa essentially provides these colonies, nations, and regions a rapid monetization channel, thereby enhancing the value of the entire area.
Such is the case with French Gabon. Through trade with East Africa, it also elevated its economic status within France’s colonial system, hence making Germany’s attempt to obtain Gabon much more challenging than historically.
Ernst told Frier: "Germany is indeed creating trouble for us, but if the German Governnt could truly acquire the Gabon Colony, it might actually be a favorable outco for us. However, our diplomatic policy dictates that we cannot lean excessively towards Germany, so going forward, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must skillfully maintain a balancing act between the German and French governnts to ensure our image of neutrality."
Regarding the actions of the German Governnt, East Africa definitely cannot obey entirely, thus playing Arica’s "neutrality" card is the most practical solution. If East Africa and the United States tilt towards either side, it could suppress the conflicts among European countries, thus influencing the dynamics of the European war.
To comply with Ernst’s demand, Frier could only agree, albeit reluctantly. This indeed tested the capabilities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and to avoid complications, Frier had to personally oversee the East African diplomatic institutions with the German and French governnts to prevent any rash actions.
As an ethnic German nation, East Africa’s dostic sentint is undeniably sympathetic towards Germany, and this could potentially influence parts of the East African officialdom. Frier’s responsibility is to prevent any rashness from defining East Africa as belonging to any particular faction, which would be a substantial loss for East Africa.
On July 9th, Germany indeed began negotiations with the French Governnt, engaging in disputes over the Moroccan issue, and as anticipated, France rejected Germany’s demands regarding Gabon.
However, both governnts displayed notable restraint, or perhaps were unprepared for war. In this context, France was left with no choice but to negotiate with Germany despite its reluctance.
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