Since the end of the Franco-Prussian War, European countries have entered a relatively stable developnt phase.
All countries have recognized their own shortcomings and are currently desperately carrying out reforms and improvents. From history, it can also be known that this period coincides exactly with the ti when erging industrial nations led by Germany and the United States continuously rise, ultimately surpassing old great powers like Britain and France in the industrial aspect.
Did the British abandon their efforts during this period, crazily giving up and allowing Germany and the United States to surpass them?
No. The British industry and economy also grew a lot during this period, and the main reason is still the scale limitation of the British mainland, which limits the upper ceiling of Britain.
Britain’s power cos from promoting the First Industrial Revolution plus colonizing nearly half the world. Without such vast colonies, Britain might not necessarily surpass Germany.
The German region has been one of Europe’s hegemons since the Holy Roman Empire period, but dostic states had nurous factions and constant wars, which is the reason why the German region did not produce a top great power.
Now the German region is tending toward unification, and Germany’s developnt is already unstoppable by any country. When all German states are combined, the territory and population they possess exceed those of Britain and France, which is also one of the fundantals of Germany’s power.
Although countries with a lot of population are not necessarily powerful, powerful countries must have a lot of population. The reason later European countries gradually decline, even needing the European Union to contend with great powers like the United States, is precisely because the population of individual European countries has far fallen short of strong powers like the United States.
The reason is also easy to understand. More population ans more labor, and more labor ans faster economic expansion speed. Between two countries with the sa industrial and economic scale, the one with more population will have greater developnt potential.
Before extrely advanced technology replaces manual labor, population is one of the standards for asuring a country’s power, and it is a relatively strict standard.
The good news is that Spain’s population growth rate, which had stagnated for several years, has finally begun to steadily increase.
Only 6 months have passed in 1872, but Spain’s population has already grown by at least 150,000, approaching the increase for the entire previous year.
Although there is no precise figure for Spain’s total population, it can currently be confird that Spain’s population has officially broken through 17 million, approximately between 05 million and 1 million.
If this good population growth montum can be maintained this year, it is expected that by the end of the year, Spain’s population will break through 2 million.
Compared to great power countries, such population is naturally not much. But for Spain itself, achieving a relatively good population growth amplitude also proves that the efforts of the Spanish Governnt have not been in vain.
The main reason affecting population growth is still the growth of per capita inco in Spain.
Actually, thinking about it, it’s normal. Only when the public can eat their fill and survive will they consider having children.
If they themselves cannot survive, having a child would not only add to their own burden but also let the child live a life worse than death.
The population birth rate can largely asure the happiness index of a country’s public life, because the unfortunate will not consider having children at all.
Although Spain is not excellent in this aspect, compared to the previous governnt, it has already made considerable progress.
As ti reaches July 1872, the spring breeze of reform has finally blown into the Spanish Governnt.
Regarding internal governnt reform, Pri Minister Primó has only two opinions: simplify governnt departnts, reduce the number of governnt office staff and monitor corruption, and improve governnt efficiency.
Corruption exists in every country, and corrupt governnts always breed corruption, which no political system or country can avoid.
Although the current Spanish Governnt was established after the revolution, this revolution did not have too deep an impact on the regional governnts.
The main impact was on the Spanish Cabinet Governnt, and it is very difficult for these officials of the Cabinet Governnt to engage in corruption.
After all, there is Pri Minister Primó above them, and an even more powerful parliant supervising. But for state governnts and municipal governnts, it is still easy to engage in corruption.
Spain’s annual fiscal budget is limited, so it is naturally impossible to waste part of it on corrupt officials and scoundrels.
However, to avoid causing deeper impact on the governnt, Pri Minister Primó still decides to let bygones be bygones for past corruption, and focus on supervising future corruption.
In addition to focusing on regulating governnt corruption, Pri Minister Primó also promulgated a decree, ordering regional and municipal governnts to appropriately reduce the number of officials.
So regional governnt officials are too nurous, with so completely freeloading. Moreover, Spanish officials’ inco is generally higher than that of ordinary people, so it is better to clear these people out early.
Carlo is naturally willing to see the governnt pay attention to supervising corrupt and embezzling officials. Carlo currently cannot manage these, so it is of course best if Pri Minister Primó takes the initiative to supervise corruption.
To make Spain’s governnts at all levels more honest and efficient, after careful consideration, Carlo also recomnded to Pri Minister Primó the establishnt of legislation on official performance appraisal.
Carlo did not explain in detail; the specific legislation still needs to be formulated by Pri Minister Primó himself.
The specific provisions are also very simple: conduct various assessnts on them according to the different responsibilities of officials at all levels of governnt.
Those who pass will accumulate political achievents, and eting certain political achievents will et the conditions for promotion. Conversely, if political achievents are too poor, they must be prepared for demotion or even direct dismissal.
However, doing so will definitely offend a large number of officials, after all, they are doing well in their current positions and may not be willing to be passively moved.
Therefore, it is better for such legislation to be submitted and promulgated by Pri Minister Primó himself; Carlo does not plan to participate too much.
Pri Minister Primó does not oppose this either. Such a thod can still effectively improve officials’ administrative efficiency and also achieve the purpose of supervising officials.
Although it will offend so diocre freeloading officials, these people are nothing but harmful to the Spanish Governnt, so it is better to eliminate them early.
Offending people is nothing serious for Pri Minister Primó. Reform has already offended a large number of forces, so what does adding one more matter?
Because he quite recognizes the performance appraisal system proposed by Carlo, a few days later, Pri Minister Primó personally submitted a draft of the 《Official Performance Appraisal Act》 to parliant.
The reason for submitting it personally is also due to the importance attached to rectifying officialdom.
Only if Pri Minister Primó submits such legislation personally can it attract the attention of those officials, thereby achieving the effect of actively rectifying officialdom.
If anyone still thinks Pri Minister Primó is just going through the motions, when the knife of integrity is placed on their necks, it will no longer be up to them.
In the draft of this legislation, Pri Minister Primó divides the Spanish Governnt into three levels: national governnt, regional governnts, and municipal governnts, all included in the performance appraisal scope.
Officials of the three levels of governnt who perform excellently can be exceptionally promoted to higher-level governnts. Those who fail will be lightly demoted and punished, or heavily directly dismissed from their official positions.
Considering that this appraisal legislation involves a large number of officials, the appraisal content will not be overly harsh.
Basically, as long as officials complete matters within their own responsibilities, they can get above-qualified evaluations. If they achieve certain political achievents, they will get above-excellent evaluations to prepare for promotion.
And those officials who cannot even handle matters within their own responsibilities, leaving them in their positions will only have a negative impact on the country.
For current Spanish officials, there are many ways they can add political achievents. For example, promoting local economic and industrial developnt, reducing illiteracy rate, promoting literacy education, promoting ethnic integration, or even developing population, all can increase their political achievents.
As long as there is even a tiny bit of contribution, achieving qualified level is not difficult.
The main purpose of doing so is still to eliminate corrupt elents and incompetent officials. Anyone with even a tiny bit of ability would not fail to achieve any rit.
According to Spain’s constitution, parliant has appointnt and removal rights over governnts at all levels. So as long as this legislation is passed by parliant, performance appraisal for the three levels of governnt can be smoothly implented.
This proposal caused an uproar in parliant, and even mbers of parliant who originally supported Pri Minister Primó hesitated sowhat.
Such an appraisal system is unprecedented and will break the long-maintained system in Spanish officialdom of appointnt by nobility and seniority first.
A large number of nobles can easily obtain quite good official positions by virtue of their bloodline, and old foxes in officialdom can also compete for high positions by virtue of their seniority.
And those truly capable rarely obtain nobility titles and official positions through their own efforts; for commoners, besides emigrating, the only path seems to be like Pri Minister Primó, gaining identity and status through revolution.
The new official performance appraisal system completely breaks Spain’s original bureaucratic system, shifting from valuing bloodline and prestige more to valuing individual ability more.
From the national level, this is of course a progress. Only if these officials rack their brains to create political achievents can Spain’s economy and industry advance rapidly under their efforts.
If these officials of regions and cities themselves do not have much enthusiasm for economic and industrial growth, how can Spain’s comprehensive national strength advance rapidly?
By linking national economic and industrial progress, including so decrees promulgated by the Cabinet Governnt, to these officials’ political achievents, even if not for national developnt, they will strive for their personal interests, for their political achievents and higher official positions.
There is a clear difference between doing it passively and doing it actively; for current Spain, it urgently needs so more passionate and dynamic young officials to change the pattern of officialdom.
“Pri Minister, is your legislation too radical?” A mber of parliant raised opposition, clearly dissatisfied with the content of the legislation submitted by Pri Minister Primó: “
This completely breaks Spain’s previous bureaucratic system. Can I think that this will cause a severe impact on Spain’s existing bureaucratic system and cause a large number of officials to lose their original jobs.”
“I admit what you said is right.” Pri Minister Primó nodded calmly in the face of the questioning, then countered: “But why not?
Rather than letting those do-nothing guys continue to stay in high positions in regional and municipal governnts, it is better to let capable and motivated young n take such positions.
Or are you willing to abandon Spain’s future developnt for your position?”
Pri Minister Primó’s questioning imdiately made the mber of parliant who raised the opposition sweat on his forehead, waving his hands repeatedly and hurriedly explaining: “I am not willing to abandon Spain’s future developnt, but just worried that such legislation will impact the existing bureaucratic system and destroy the stability that Spain has barely maintained.”
“No need to worry about this.” Pri Minister Primó said with a playful smile on his face, aningfully: “This legislation is a must for Spain’s reform and concerns the success or failure of the reform.
Gentlen, are you willing to see those unwilling to contribute to the country standing in important positions in regional and municipal governnts?
For Spain, we are willing to endure any pain. Only by letting those truly willing to strive for Spain’s revival take important positions can Spain’s revival beco reality, rather than just our dream.
All fluctuations caused by the legislation are temporary; the impact on Spain is long-term. For the future of a stronger Spain, I believe we can tolerate temporary pain in exchange for the opportunity for Spain to beco stronger.”
After Pri Minister Primó’s persuasion, reformist mbers of parliant also expressed their support for this legislation.
After all, most reformists are young people with ideals, ambitions, and certain abilities. Their voice in the political arena is not high; this legislation not only will not affect them but will beco a weapon for them to rise in officialdom.
Actually, seniority-based promotion is common in officialdom of various countries, after all, everyone is willing to trust officials who appear more mature rather than a fledgling hot-blooded youth.
For other jobs, twenties to thirties is the ti of peak energy. But for governnt departnt work, thirties to forties is still too young, and forties to fifties is the most mature golden age for a politician.
Pri ministers of various countries are generally old n in their forties to fifties or even fifties to sixties, because only then can they convince officials and the public of various countries.
Actually, in terms of pri ministers and important governnt departnts, the harm of seniority is not that great. But in regional and municipal governnts, the harm of seniority is still quite significant.
If older officials do not move from their positions, the younger generation cannot rise. Currently in Spain’s regions and municipal governnts, only a small portion of young officials under 30, most are middle-aged officials over
A large portion of these people are conservatives, and when facing reform decrees promulgated by the Spanish Governnt, even if they do not openly oppose much, they will hinder the passage of decrees in various ways behind the scenes.
Failure of decrees to pass is Spain’s biggest problem currently. Decrees promulgated by the kingdom governnt are difficult to implent smoothly and quickly in regional governnts.
The solution to this problem is also simple: replace those rigid conservative officials with young officials who support reform.
These promoted young officials, to keep their positions and advance further, will support reform more, which will naturally more effectively promote Spain’s reform.
The reform of every country is extrely difficult because reform needs to confront entitled beneficiaries and so rigid conservatives existing within the country.
Regardless of whether they are willing to be loyal to the kingdom governnt, as long as they hinder the promotion of Spain’s reform, this problem must eventually be dealt with.
“Pri Minister, I do not oppose the implentation of this decree. But I have a question: if we implent performance-priority official appointnt and removal, will it make so officials go to extres for their own political achievents?
Also, how can we ensure the loyalty of these officials promoted by political achievents to the governnt? If they are not loyal to the governnt, promoting them will also harm the country.” Another official raised his question, but compared to the previous direct opposition, this one is obviously much milder.
“This is also simple.” Pri Minister Primó nodded and gave his answer: “Regarding performance appraisal, parliant can take full responsibility and establish corresponding institutions for official performance appraisal.
Those who falsify in performance will have their performance abolished and given the worst result in appraisal. What we need is political achievents that can truly improve Spain’s livelihood and economic industrial developnt, not falsified scores by officials for their own interests.
Secondly, official appraisals can also add requirents for political ideology. All Spanish officials must be officials who love this country; I do not want those without affection for the country to take high governnt positions.
This aspect can even set certain appraisals to ensure our officials have excellent abilities and loyal thoughts.”
This is sothing Pri Minister Primó had already thought of. Although individual ability is relatively important in the new performance appraisal system, it does not an abandoning appraisal of officials’ personal character and ideology.
An official with great ability, if his ideology has problems, will harm the country.
Wrong ideology lightly produces corruption, heavily betrays the country and governnt; either choice will cause huge harm to Spain.
Pri Minister Primó is unwilling for the officials screened by the performance appraisal system to fall into the vortex of corruption again, or even worse, directly betray the country and governnt.
Five thousand word two-in-one chapter, seeking support!
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