Although there were clearly so people in Parliant who had different attitudes toward this Official Performance Appraisal Act, it was obviously impossible to hinder the implentation of this legislation at this ti.
More than half of the seats in the Spanish Parliant were occupied by the Progressive Party to which Pri Minister Primó belonged, and the Liberal Party, which also supported reform, held nearly 20% of the seats.
Together, these two accounted for more than 70% of the parliantary seats. According to the constitution of Spain, when affirmative votes exceed 70%, the legislation can be established and begin execution.
However, Pri Minister Primó did not intend to completely offend those Conservative Parties either. Although a corresponding performance appraisal system was established for the existing bureaucratic system, the departnt responsible for the appraisals was jointly composed by Parliant and the Cabinet.
At the sa ti, Parliant also has supervisory power over the Cabinet. Cabinet mbers must also complete the so-called performance appraisals, and in cases of consistently poor appraisals over multiple tis, Parliant has the power to impeach all Cabinet mbers including the Pri Minister, and decide the retention or dismissal of that Cabinet mber based on the final results of the Cabinet eting.
This clearly strengthened the power of Parliant, which was also the reason the legislation ultimately passed in Parliant.
However, for Pri Minister Primó, whether strengthening the power of the Cabinet Governnt or strengthening the power of Parliant made little practical difference.
Pri Minister Primó firmly controlled Spain’s Cabinet Governnt and Parliant; rather than calling it growth in parliantary power, it was more accurately growth in Pri Minister Primó’s power.
This legislation had little impact on the Spanish civilian sector, and the public even cheered it on.
But for Spanish officialdom, the promulgation of this legislation was no less than a small-scale earthquake.
However, neither Carlo nor Pri Minister Primó intended to conduct a large-scale purge of Spain’s officialdom at this ti.
This legislation was actually targeted at those officials who had both a style of corruption and absolutely no political ability. Their staying in official positions would only harm the country, with not even the slightest benefit.
Those who were honest but lacked ability, or had so ability but were corrupt, would actually not be on Pri Minister Primó’s purge list.
After all, to put it bluntly, these officials all had their own value in existence. Officials who lacked ability but were relatively honest could also be assigned to other positions that did not test ability so much.
And those officials with so ability but corrupt could also be used for temporary tasks. These people could to so extent be turned into livestock kept by the Spanish Governnt, fattened up and then slaughtered to fill the national finances.
There was no fear of officials being corrupt, only fear of officials who had no ability and only knew to be corrupt. As long as they could do a little practical work for the cities and regions, promoting local industry or economic developnt, Carlo and Pri Minister Primó would not pay too much attention.
After all, everyone had their own little sches, and Carlo could not demand that all Spanish officials be honest and upright good officials.
As long as the corruption was not too outrageous, such as embezzling a few tens of thousands from a million in funds, it was harmless.
But if tens of thousands could be embezzled from a million in funds, no matter how capable, they would certainly enter Pri Minister Primó’s purge list.
Of course, corruption also depended on thods and ans. Directly embezzling from appropriations of the Spanish Governnt must naturally be resolutely prohibited, but if it was squeezing the old-style nobles and the Church through various ans, greater tolerance was also acceptable.
Before announcing this legislation, Pri Minister Primó had also deliberately conveyed a statent to the vast majority of Spanish officials through Progressive Party mbers of Parliant spreading it by word of mouth, that past corruption would be pardoned.
As long as past corruption was not so exaggerated, and the funds were less than one million pesetas, the Spanish Governnt would pardon it and not pursue past wrongs.
If the embezzled funds exceeded one million pesetas, it was simple: as long as most of the illicit gains were promptly paid to the governnt, removing a na from the list could be arranged.
In short, this was Pri Minister Primó’s attitude, or rather the common attitude of Carlo and Pri Minister Primó.
As long as there was so ability, a little flaw could be accepted. If there was no ability and only flaws, it was better to make way for others sooner.
Of course, excluding the rebels and traitors. No matter how capable the rebels and traitors were, once acts of rebellion or betraying the country were discovered, they must be strictly dealt with to guarantee the stability of the Spanish Governnt.
The one million peseta limit was the result of Pri Minister Primó’s deep consideration. This would allow most people to escape disaster, while catching a few typical cases of more serious corruption.
If these people were sensible, they could also wash away their cris by promptly turning over their illicit gains to the governnt, exempting themselves from the purge.
At the sa ti, it also signaled to other officials that the governnt truly had no intention of purging the past, adopting an attitude of pardoning everyone.
But if these people did not know what was good for them, Pri Minister Primó would not mind letting them understand the harshness and cruelty of Spanish law, and what the ultimate fate of embezzlers was.
In terms of impact, the forces affected by this legislation were still mainly the old-style nobles.
There was no way around it; the Spain of the past had been too corrupt, with the governnt and army almost controlled by nobles. How did these nobles acquire their vast estates? Was it not through the aristocracy controlling all of Spain, annexing them from Spanish farrs by any ans possible.
Since nobles could accumulate vast lands during that ti, they could naturally embezzle through various ans as well.
The forr Arican Colony provided Spain with vast gold and silver treasures; only a portion of these materials entered the coffers of the Royal Family and governnt, while large amounts beca private property of nobles and the Church.
Among this, there was certainly property legally obtained by nobles and the Church through operations, but to say it was all earned through legal ans was probably not the case.
In any case, this legislation did affect a large number of old-style nobles, after all, they were the most likely to embezzle over one million pesetas from the governnt.
Although one million pesetas was nothing to the Spanish Governnt, it was still a huge sum close to 40,000 pound sterling, quite valuable in this era.
Converted to gold, it was fully 290 kilograms, the weight of half a ton of gold.
As the greatest noble, Carlo naturally also paid attention to the impact of this legislation on the old-style nobles.
However, Carlo could not stand by, after all, these nobles were openly loyal to the Royal Family, and Carlo could not ignore them.
Taking the opportunity of the Royal United Bank convening a shareholder eting, Carlo held talks with many great Spanish nobles, and discussed the recently announced 《Spanish Official Performance Appraisal Act》 and the handling of past corruption.
Carlo secretly expressed his true attitude toward this legislation, but also provided protection to the nobles.
Carlo stated that nobles whose past embezzlent exceeded one million pesetas only needed to make a gratuitous donation of one million pesetas to the Royal United Bank, and Carlo would pardon them.
The reason it was a gratuitous donation to the Royal United Bank was because the Royal United Bank was a bank jointly established by the Royal Family and nobles.
These corrupt nobles donating to the Royal United Bank ant the actual benefits still went to the Royal Family and nobles.
Carlo’s decision received support from the other nobles; after all, for most nobles, they gained actual benefits without doing anything.
As long as one noble donated to the bank, the nobles could divide 250,000 pesetas based on their shares. Even one person was like this; if more nobles donated to the bank, the funds divided among the uninvolved nobles would be even more.
During the eting, it was already clear that several nobles had ideas, but they would not express their willingness to donate to Carlo in public.
In fact, it was so; after this eting ended, several nobles privately found Carlo, expressing willingness to clear their past sins through donations.
But most nobles remained unmoved. After all, noble wealth was accumulated over a hundred years or even centuries, not sothing one generation of nobles could create.
Most nobles’ personal embezzled funds did not reach one million pesetas, and Carlo could not purge the previous generation of nobles who had already passed away.
But in any case, the final result still t Carlo’s expectations. This incident also served as a warning to these old-style nobles, letting them understand that the current Kingdom of Spain was not like the previous Kingdom governnt, and the Royal Family would not allow these old-style nobles to exploit Spain’s grassroots people wantonly.
For the implentation of the Official Performance Appraisal Act, Pri Minister Primó clearly attached much greater importance.
Since the Spanish Parliant passed this legislation, Pri Minister Primó required the regional governnts to formulate performance appraisals for all officials in the entire region within one month and submit them to the official appraisal departnt established by Parliant and the governnt.
Assigning reasonable tasks to all officials in the entire region thus beca the primary task for each regional governor. Doing it well would be their political achievent; doing it poorly would naturally deduct points from them.
Starting from the day the legislation was promulgated, the Spanish Governnt’s appraisals of all officials had already begun.
Pri Minister Primó had no patience whatsoever for those officials who were both incompetent and immoral. Swiftly removing these officials who lacked ability and engaged in major corruption in the shortest ti was what Pri Minister Primó had to do.
To motivate officials’ enthusiasm, Pri Minister Primó also had the official performance appraisal departnt establish specific reward and punishnt systems.
Although poor performance in appraisals would lead to governnt penalties or even dismissal from office, good appraisal results could also increase one’s salary, accumulate rit, and lead to promotion.
Accumulating military rit could obtain a nobility title, and accumulating political achievent could naturally also obtain a nobility title. Knowing that re promotion and salary increases could not attract all Spanish officials, Pri Minister Primó specially consulted Carlo, clarifying that accumulating political achievent could also earn the opportunity for ennoblent.
Even for those of commoner background, if they established significant political achievent in their official position, coupled with consistently excellent performance in political affairs appraisals, they would have the opportunity for ennoblent.
As long as they worked diligently for a lifeti without committing any serious errors, obtaining a baron’s nobility title was relatively easy.
It was not like before; nobles were indeed common in Spain, and barons were not rare.
Even counts in Spain were like honorary titles, already commonplace.
Even the number of dukes was not small, which was also why Carlo had always been troubled by the old-style nobles, because there were simply too many of these old-style Spanish nobles, a frighteningly large number.
Ennoblent and official promotion held little attraction for those great nobles, after all, they were already at the pinnacle among Spanish nobles, with little room for their nobility titles to advance further.
Only those at the pinnacle of Spanish politics and the military like Pri Minister Primó and Grand Duke Serrano could go further and have room for elevation in nobility titles.
For most dukes, guarding their family’s existing property and advancing further on that basis was already very good.
As for the grand duke title above duke, obtaining it required establishing considerable rit, which was not so easy.
To motivate a large number of commoner-origin officials, Pri Minister Primó also assigned many relatively simple tasks, such as reducing illiteracy rates in various places, more widely promoting the use of Spanish language, etc., all of which could be achieved with a little effort.
Not exactly free rit, but absolutely very easy to complete.
For example, reducing the illiteracy rate, which the governnt was vigorously promoting. As long as local officials were not foolish and actively cooperated with governnt policies, a reduction in illiteracy rate was inevitable.
As for promoting Spanish language, it was mainly aid at officials in Catalonia and the Basque region.
If officials wanted political achievent, they had to promote the use of Spanish language in these regions and reduce the application scenarios of local languages.
Previously, it was the Spanish Governnt confronting these nationalists; next, it would be the regional governors of Catalonia and the Basque region doing these things.
Nationalists promoting local language use would harm local officials’ political achievent; even if unwilling, they must minimize local language use in the area for their own future.
The officials in these regions were basically local ethnic groups, and through this thod, opposition could also be ford between local nationalists and officials, reducing the threat of local independence through division.
The officialdom reform caused a great sensation, but in reality, only a small portion of officials were affected.
In the two months from July to August 1872, the appraisal departnt seriously dealt with at least 200 officials, including no lack of mayors and managers of minor governnt departnts.
Fortunately, after Pri Minister Primó took office, he had overhauled the Cabinet; currently, all Cabinet ministers were reform-supporting Progressive Party or Liberal Party mbers. These people might not be so loyal to Carlo, but their abilities were still decent, at least not incompetent.
Combined chapter, short by a thousand words, to be supplented tomorrow.
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