Starting from November 1875, Spain thoroughly entered Carlo’s era.
On November 11, more than 20 nobles and officials whose cris were confird after trial were publicly executed in the city center square of Madrid.
These nobles and officials sentenced to death could freely choose the thod of execution, such as the guillotine or gallows.
The large-scale execution of officials and nobles also made the public extrely curious, as even the revolution six or seven years ago did not reach the point of mass public executions of nobles.
Carlo’s ability to issue execution orders against nobles was seen by the Spanish people as valuing the opinions of the Spanish people.
Executed alongside these more than 20 noble officials were the bosses of those factories at the very center of the public opinion storm, naly those exposed.
To quell the anger of Spanish workers, they had to be pulled out as scapegoats. However, they were not entirely innocent, as flies do not bite seamless eggs. Being used by rebel nobles as an excuse for parades at least proved that their usual exploitation of workers was not minimal.
In addition to executing these criminals, the governnt also publicly announced the handling of other nobles and officials whose cris did not warrant death.
First, regardless of whether nobles or officials, all their property was confiscated, and nobles’ nobility titles were abolished. Their family mbers were prohibited from running for mber of parliant for 50 years, and those currently elected as mbers of parliant were also stripped of their mber of parliant qualifications simultaneously.
Depending on the degree of their participation in the rebellion, they were sentenced to different periods of imprisonnt. But among these people, the shortest imprisonnt was nearly 20 years, and the longest was life imprisonnt.
Carlo would establish a new prison in the Congo Territory to hold these traitors. As for whether these people would go to prison to serve their sentences or go to the Congo Territory as laborers, only people in the Congo Territory knew.
Anyway, these people were all criminals, and rather than letting them stay in prison wasting grain, it was better to let them contribute their last bit of residual heat and make a contribution to the developnt of the Congo Territory.
After executing these criminals, the Spanish Governnt imdiately turned its attention to protecting workers’ rights.
The main reason for the large-scale workers’ parade across Madrid before was that those factory owners were too unscrupulous in their acknowledged exploitation.
Although the governnt had promulgated the corresponding 《Laborer Protection Law》, laws always have loopholes to exploit. These capitalists tried every ans to exploit the loopholes in the law, still able to exploit workers arbitrarily in areas not covered by legal supervision.
To ensure workers’ interests and also to completely quell the public anger caused by the workers’ parade, Spanish Provisional Governnt Pri Minister Serrano publicly stated that he would promote further reform of the 《Laborer Protection Law》, clarifying workers’ working hours and minimum inco, and implenting it in all regions nationwide.
Serrano acted quickly, promulgating Spain’s new 《Laborer Protection Law》 in just a few days.
The new 《Laborer Protection Law》 stipulates that when Spanish citizens work in enterprises and factories on the mainland, the daily normal working hours shall not exceed ten hours.
After single-day working hours exceed ten hours, the extra working ti will be considered overti and should receive salary higher than ordinary working hours, at least raised to 5 tis the salary of ordinary working hours.
Spanish citizens’ weekly working hours shall not exceed 70 hours, and they should have at least 2 days of holiday per month. Workers still on jobs during large holidays and important events should be provided by factories and enterprises with overti inco of more than 5 tis ordinary working hours.
Although the governnt did not explicitly require that workers’ working hours not exceed ten hours, as long as it exceeds ten hours, factories must provide workers with 5 tis the overti wages compared to ordinary working hours.
This also satisfied the workers’ demands. The reason workers were angry was not overti itself, but overti without any reward.
As long as overti could bring higher inco, most workers were still willing to work a bit harder themselves while making their inco a bit higher.
The new 《Laborer Protection Law》 regulates Spanish citizens’ working hours, while the newly promulgated 《Laborer’s Minimum Inco Law》 next modifies the minimum inco standards obtained by Spanish citizens participating in labor.
For current Spain, the minimum inco law promulgated a few years ago is obviously no longer applicable.
In the six years of Spain’s rapid developnt, per capita inco has also seen huge improvents. If all Spanish laborers were still protected according to the previous minimum inco law, factory owners would have a lot of room to exploit laborers.
Since revisions were to be made, the minimum inco law definitely needed to be revised as well.
According to the latest 《Laborer’s Minimum Inco Law》, the minimum inco obtained by Spanish citizens participating in labor has also seen a significant increase.
The minimum weekly salary for adult male Spanish citizens when working shall not be less than 2 pesetas 15 copper coins, and for adult female Spanish citizens, not less than 1 peseta 75 copper coins.
The minimum weekly salary for male Spanish citizens over 50 years old when working shall not be less than 1 peseta 60 copper coins, and for females over 50, not less than 1 peseta 25 copper coins.
The minimum weekly salary for child labor when working shall uniformly not be less than 90 copper coins, and child labor shall not work overti for any reason, with daily working hours not exceeding ten hours, and every Sunday as a rest day for child labor.
Compared to the 《Laborer’s Minimum Inco Law》 from a few years ago, this latest minimum inco law is obviously much stronger in terms of inco protection.
Even child labor’s weekly salary is guaranteed above 90 copper coins, which is higher than the weekly salary for female Spanish citizens over 50 in the previous inco law.
The reason child labor’s inco received a huge increase is mainly to take care of those poor families who have no choice but to let children work.
Carlo can allow capitalists to exploit workers to a certain extent, as this is beneficial to factory production and to Spain’s industrial construction and economic developnt.
But if capitalists want to exploit even child labor, Carlo doesn’t mind letting them feel the strength of Spanish judiciary.
Child labor’s interests must be protected, with daily working hours not exceeding ten hours, and at least one day per week as rest ti; this is Carlo’s bottom line.
This latest 《Laborer’s Minimum Inco Law》 was formulated with reference to Spain’s per capita inco. The economic situations of Spanish Autonomous Communities are different, and the minimum incos in various regions have so fluctuations.
But such fluctuations only consider the issue that people in more developed economic regions should receive higher incos, so the fluctuations of the minimum inco law in various regions only allow increases, not decreases.
With two consecutive laws on protecting laborers’ interests being revised, the public anger caused by the workers’ parade was completely quelled.
Still the sa words, the Spanish people still trust the Spanish Governnt. What they are angry about is only the capitalists’ exploitation of workers, and they have little dissatisfaction with the governnt.
After the governnt consecutively revised the laws on labor laws, the public only has satisfaction and admiration for the governnt, impossible to have any dissatisfaction or opposition.
Carlo and Grand Duke Serrano, who led the revision of labor laws, also gained the love and praise of the Spanish people.
A few days later in the Royal Palace of Madrid, Carlo t with Count Canovas, who had beco Deputy Pri Minister of the provisional cabinet.
In this rebellion, the biggest beneficiaries, besides Carlo who gained governnt power, were Grand Duke Serrano who beca Pri Minister and Count Canovas who beca Deputy Pri Minister.
Anyone with eyes could see that Grand Duke Serrano becoming Pri Minister was just a transition, and the next to formally serve as Pri Minister would definitely be Count Canovas.
The reason was also simple. First, Grand Duke Serrano was already of advanced age at 65, without much energy to control the Spanish Governnt.
Second, Grand Duke Serrano himself had extrely high prestige in the military and was Spain’s Minister of Defense for two terms since the revolution.
If he beca Pri Minister as well, wouldn’t his prestige rival that of Pri Minister Primó in the past? Carlo had finally waited for the chance to grasp power, so how could he allow another Pri Minister Primó to be born?
It was precisely such thinking that made many mbers of parliant and officials feel that Count Canovas, who had little prestige in the military, would ultimately serve as Spain’s Pri Minister.
Carlo certainly thought the sa, but not out of defense against Grand Duke Serrano, rather feeling that Canovas, this younger fellow, was more suitable to serve as Spain’s Pri Minister.
Canovas was born in 1828, currently only 47 years old. On the position of Pri Minister, current Canovas was clearly still in his pri, with plenty of ti and energy to manage Spain’s political affairs.
Grand Duke Serrano was after all of advanced age at Moreover, Grand Duke Serrano himself was not very good at political affairs and economic developnt; otherwise, he wouldn’t have let Pri Minister Primó serve as Pri Minister after the revolution, while he himself beca Minister of Defense.
Letting Canovas take over as Spain’s Pri Minister, because he was in his pri, he could cooperate with Carlo for two terms, that is, ten years.
Longer ruling ti was extrely valuable for the current developnt stage of Spain. What was feared was too frequent regi changes, which would cause a country with hope for rapid developnt to fall into developnt stagnation due to regi transitions.
Historical Spain in this period was precisely because of internal strife and frequent regi changes. After Queen Isabella ca the provisional governnt, after the provisional governnt ca Amadeo I, after Amadeo I ca the republican governnt, after the republican governnt ca Alfonso XII.
During this period, whether three kings or the provisional governnt and republican governnt, the positions of Spain’s Pri Minister and President never had overly stable candidates.
This also led to historical Spain having almost no stable developnt space during this period, and after missing this relatively golden developnt ti, Spain thoroughly fell into weakness.
Carlo would not repeat the mistakes. Unless Spain’s Pri Minister had issues with loyalty, Carlo would not consider changing Pri Ministers too frequently.
Of course, if there were ability issues, they still needed to be changed. After all, only a capable Pri Minister could promote national developnt; an incapable one would only make things worse.
Spain’s political parties and mbers of parliant were concerned with the issue of reorganizing parliant and holding new elections, while at this ti Carlo was concerned with the issue of the large tracts of land obtained after confiscating nobles’ property.
Speaking of which, even though nearly a hundred nobles participated in the rebellion, they were only one-tenth of Spain’s noble group.
But precisely this one-tenth of nobles had property too nurous to count, and land even more to an exaggerated number.
Preliminary statistics show that the land area owned by these nobles exceeds 1 million acres, of which nearly 600,000 acres are arable land, which is a much-needed arable land resource for current Spain.
After all property of these rebel nobles is fully inventoried, the land resources obtained will be even more.
Although not enough to completely solve Spain’s arable land area troubles, it at least solves a considerable part.
Carlo did not plan to control these lands in his own hands, but to sell or rent them to local people for planting.
Land sales were at standard market price, and for so low-inco poor families, subsidies not exceeding 10% could be considered.
For renting, it was completely according to Spain’s land rent law, and Carlo would not lower the rent further on this basis, as sotis appropriate charges were beneficial to maintaining relations with the public.
But in any case, a portion of these lands would ultimately be transferred. Carlo did not plan to let the royal family beco landowner nobility; the royal family only needed to master a small portion of land.
There were countless industries more profitable than farming and renting land, and Carlo had no need to compete with other farrs for food in the agriculture sector.
Except for retaining a portion of plain and flat land to cope with future chanized agriculture developnt, the rest of the land was best sold to the governnt or farrs.
Moreover, speaking of land, the royal family still held a complete Congo Territory. The land area of the Congo Territory had no upper limit; wherever Spanish Colonial Strongholds were established, that was part of the Congo Territory.
Currently, Carlo still had a headache over the developnt of the Congo Territory and naturally would not cling to these lands.
And a few days later, the royal family began to gradually sell and rent out the confiscated lands of those nobles externally.
The prices for external land sales were very fair, and directed at selling to local farrs to avoid these lands flowing back into nobles’ hands.
For those farrs who really had no money to buy land, the royal family could also rent land to them at low prices. Spain’s current land rent was relatively low, at least much lower than before the land rent law was promulgated.
This also effectively protected farrs’ inco; at least current Spanish farrs’ inco had seen considerable growth.
Besides owning large tracts of land, nobles also owned large and small castles and manors, as well as various other industries.
Carlo had Butler Loren screen these castles and manors; so castles and manors with better geographical locations and environnts could be retained by the royal family.
While those with poorer locations or environnts were publicly sold externally, sold to Spanish nobles or capitalists in exchange for funds.
Although the Royal Palace of Madrid was one of Europe’s three major palaces, Carlo did not plan to live long-term in the Royal Palace of Madrid.
Appropriately going to so manors with better environnts for vacation and residence not only achieved the purpose of relaxation but was also beneficial to physical health.
Current Spanish Royal Family, besides the Royal Palace of Madrid, indeed did not have many castles and manors to provide for Carlo’s vacations.
These nobles’ properties were a good supplent for Carlo; at least several nobles’ manors and castles quite t Carlo’s requirents.
In nobles’ castles and manors, there were also large amounts of precious jewelry and other property. Because the quantity was too scattered, even though Butler Loren had led people to inventory for several days, it was still not fully inventoried.
But what could be determined was that the property of these nearly hundred nobles added up was too nurous to count; just cash alone was nearly ten million pesetas.
The value of those gold jewelry and various antiques and paintings was even as high as several tens of millions of pesetas. The currently inventoried property had a total value already close to 50 million pesetas.
Although a considerable portion was contributed by those dukes, the cumulative property of counts and barons was also not a small number.
Actually, including those lands, these rebel nobles’ property would be even more. And those castles and manors, the value of these immovable properties was inestimable.
So castles had histories up to several hundred years; although not much to Carlo, if put up for auction in posterity, they would easily exceed 100 million, and in US dollars.
Good news was that these nobles’ property and various gold, silver, and jewelry could be easily sold off.
Even the value of the currently inventoried property was enough to increase the royal family’s property by one-twentieth.
However, Carlo did not plan to keep all this property for himself, but to establish an organization related to poverty alleviation and public welfare to boost the royal family’s reputation.
Carlo acted quickly; this institution for boosting the royal family’s reputation was established in Madrid in just a few days.
This charity institution was nad by Carlo as the Spanish Royal Relief Committee, with the purpose of providing help and aid within its capacity to Spain’s extrely low-inco population.
On the day of announcing the establishnt of the Royal Relief Committee, Carlo publicly stated that he would inject 5 million pesetas into the Royal Relief Committee for aiding low-inco population, and promised to inject no less than 2 million pesetas into the Royal Relief Committee annually.
To let the Royal Relief Committee realize its value, Carlo even stated encouragent for all Spaniards to supervise the expenditure of the Royal Relief Committee, ensuring all funds invested in the Royal Relief Committee were used to help low-inco population, rather than letting so people line their own pockets.
After all, it was an institution for boosting the royal family’s reputation, so so real deeds still needed to be done.
Besides having headquarters in Madrid, the Royal Relief Committee would also expand to the capital cities of Spanish Autonomous Communities, spreading the Spanish Royal Family’s good reputation across the entire Spain, bringing massive prestige to the royal family every year.
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